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Preventing Highway Crashes by Raising the 
Legal Minimum Age for Drinking: 
The Michigan Experience 6 Years Later 
Alexander C. Wagenaar 
Results of a 6-year follovv-up of previous research evaluating the effects of 
Llichigan’s December 1978 increase in the legal drinking age from IS to 21 
are reported. Earlier research demonstrated the immediate effect of 
Xlichigan’s raised legal age in reducing motor vehicle crash involvement 
among young drivers. The current study examined 6 years of post-law traffic 
crash data, using Box-Jenkins intervention analysis methods to assess the 
long-term effects of the raised drinking age. Results revealed long-term ef- 
fects of the law similar to the initial effects identified earlier. Over the 6-year 
follo\v-up period, the rate of involvement in injury-producing single-vehicle 
nighttime crashes among drivers age IS-Z0 was 16% lower than the level ex- 
pected. had the drinking age law not changed. Police-reported drinking 
driver crash involvement \vas down 19%. In contrast to many alcohol-im- 
Paired driving countermeasures, the raised legal drinking age appears to 
have a long-term effect in reducing motor vehicle crash involvement among 
young drivers. 
The legal minimum age for purchase and 
consumption of alcoholic beverages con- 
tinues to attract a high degree of public 
policy attention in the United States. The 
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(1982)) National Council on Alcoholism 
(1982)) The Presidential Commission on 
Drunk Driving (1983), American Medical 
Association (1986)) and numerous other 
organizations and individuals have recom- 
mended that all states with a legal drinking 
age below 21 for any category of alcoholic 
beverages raise the age to 21. Federal legis- 
lation was enacted in July 1984 that with- 
holds a portion of federal highway grants to 
states that have not implemented a mini- 
mum drinking age of 21. In order to avoid 
losing highway construction funds, many 
states with drinking ages below 21 are now 
considering legislation to raise their legal 
Fall 19SGNolume IilXumber 3 101 
age. Recent actions in support of a drinking 
age of 21 are based on considerable evi- 
dence indicating that an increase in the 
legal drinking age results in a significant de- 
cline in the number of young drivers in- 
vol\,ed in alcohol-related motor vehicle 
crashes. 
Numerous studies of the louvered drink- 
ing age appeared in the 197Os, and several 
studies of increases in legal age have ap- 
peared in the past fexv years. Based on 
studies using controlled scientific methods, 
lowering the legal age for alcohol consump- 
tion is frequently associated nith an im- 
mediate increase in alcohol-related traffic 
crash involvement among the group af- 
fected by the law, and raising the legal age 
is associated \vith an immediate decrease in 
such crashes. Although discussion continues 
on the exact size of the estimated effects, it 
is no\v Lvell established that increasing the 
legal drinking age from 18 to 20 or 21 typi- 
cally leads to 5 to 30% reductions in motor 
vehicle casualties among youth. 
The literature on the effects of the drink- 
ing age on youth crash involvement has 
been revielved in detail elsenhere (tVag- 
enaar, 1983). Two recent studies, not in- 
cluded in previous literature reviews, \vill 
be noted here. The National Highxvay Traf- 
fic Safety Administration (Arnold, 1985) es- 
amined raised legal drinking ages in 13 
states and found a 13% reduction in fatal 
crash involvement among drivers affected 
by the legal changes. A similar study of 26 
states conducted by The Insurance Institute 
for High\vay Safety (DuMouchel, Wil- 
liams, & Zador, 1985) found a 13% reduc- 
tion in nighttime fatal crash involvement in 
the affected age groups. 
One question that requires follow-up re- 
search is Lvhether the immediate effect of 
the raised drinking age in reducing traffic 
crashes is sustained over the long term. 
There are three basic possibilities regarding 
the long-term effects of raising the drinking 
age. The short-term effects already demon- 
strated may: (a) continue unchanged as a 
permanent crash reduction, (b) dissipate 
over time as \.oung drinkers gradually iden- 
tify alternative sources of alcohol, or (c) 
become even larger as nexv cohorts of young 
drivers emerge that have never had legal ac- 
cess to alcohol and have not developed a 
pattern of regular drinking and driving 
after drinking. 
Xlichigan is one state in xvhich the effects 
of legal drinking age changes have been 
carefullv evaluated. Lonering the legal age 
for all alcoholic be\.erages from 21 to 1s in 
January 1972 was follo\ced by a 17 to 35 % 
increase in alcohol-related crash involve- 
ment among youth (Douglass & Freedman, 
1977). The increase in legal age for all bev- 
erages from 18 to 21 in December 1978 was 
followed bv a 22 to ZS% reduction in the 
number of-young drivers involved in alco- 
hol-related crashes over the subsequent 12 
months (iVagenaar. 1982, 1983.) After sub- 
tracting reductions in crash involvement 
across all age groups that were due to other 
factors, a significant 11 to 28 7 reduction in 
alcohol-related crash involl.ement re- 
mained attributable to the raised drinking 
age.’ Analyses of control states in Lvhich the 
legal drinking age was not changed re- 
vealed no comparable changes in crash in- 
volvement. 
The current follolv-up study fvas de- 
signed to determine Lvhether the short-term 
effects of Xlichigan’s raised legal drinking 
age were maintained 6 years later. 
METHOD 
Data lvere collected on all injury-produc- 
ing traffic crashes that occurred in the State 
of Michigan from January 1976 through De- 
cember 1984. Frequency of injury crash in- 
volvement was stratified by age, to permit 
comparisons of Is-20 year olds (the group di- 
rectly affected by the higher drinking age) 
lvith motorists age 21 and over. Such com- 
parisons ensured that broader changes in crash 
involvement in the early 198Os- due to non- 
age-specific alcohol-impaired driving pro- 
grams and a major economic recession. for 
example- were controlled when estimating 
the effects of the legal drinking age. 
The legal age change is expected to re- 
duce the incidence of alcohol impairment in 
drivers under 21. Txvo indicators of alco- 
‘Exact estimates of the drinking age effect vary de- 
pending on t’he indicator of alcohol-related crashes and 
analytic model used. 
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hol-related crash involvement xvere there- 
fore examined. The first was based on the 
responses of investigating police officers to 
an item on the standardized report form 
asking whether or not the driver “had been 
drinking” (HBD). This item is independent 
of anv judgment by the officer that alcohol 
contributed to or caused the crash. Xlore- 
over, it is not dependent on an arrest for 
driving under the influence or on the results 
of a chemical test.’ The item therefore has a 
high degree of face validity as a measure of 
the presence of alcohol in a crash. However, 
the HBD indicator relies on police judg- 
ments and therefore is potentially unreli- 
able. For example, increased public atten- 
tion to alcohol-impaired driving in recent 
years, policy changes such as the raised 
drinking age, and other events may affect 
the propensity of policy officers to record 
the presence of alcohol. 
TO control for the potential unreliabili- 
ty of the HBD measure, an indirect indica- 
tor of alcohol-related crashes vvas also ex- 
amined: single-vehicle nighttime (SVN) 
crashes. Single-vehicle crashes occurring at 
night have a high probabilitv of involving 
an alcohol-impaired driver and are there- 
fore frequently used as a surrogate indicator 
of alcohol-related crashes (National High- 
way Traffic Safety Administration, 19S5). 
The indicator is not perfect, however, 
because a number of alcohol-impaired 
drivers are involved in crashes that do not 
fall into the SVN category and a number of 
SVN crashes do not involve drinking 
drivers. Nevertheless, the SVN measure is 
valuable because of its consistency over 
time; there is little chance that the record- 
ing of time of day and number of vehicles 
involved will change during the period ex- 
amined. 
Time-series intervention analysis methods 
were used to estimate changes in crash rates 
associated with the raised drinking age, con- 
trolling for long-term trends and cycles in 
crash rates McCleary & Hay, 19SO). Auto-Re- 
gressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) 
‘\Vhether an arrest is made and a chemical test ad- 
ministered is a function of a number of factors in addi- 
tion to the mere presence of a driver who has recent]! 
consumed alcohol. 
models vvere developed using the iterative 
identification, estimation, and diagnosis strat- 
egy suggested by Box and Jenkins (1976). 
Transfer functions for the drinking age in- 
tervention were added to the ARIMA models 
and simultaneously estimated using the non- 
linear Gauss-Xlarquardt backcasting estima- 
tion algorithm implemented in BMDPST 
(Dixon et al., 1983). All of the final models 
reported here meet the multiple criteria for 
model adequacy suggested by Box and Jen- 
kins (significant noise model parameters, low 
correlations among parameters. and insignif- 
icant residual autocorrelations). 
RESULTS 
The immediate declines in youth crash in- 
volvement following implementation of the 
higher drinking age (Wagenaar. 1982, 19S3) 
are evident in Figures 1 and 2. Both figures 
also indicate a downward trend from 1979 
through 1984. This downward trend does not 
mean that the safety benefits of the raised 
drinking age were larger in the early 1980s 
than in 1979. Drivers of all ages experienced 
fewer traffic crashes in those years (Figures 
3 and 1). Such overall crash reductions prob- 
ably resulted from reduced trav.el and the 
other effects of a major economic recession 
(Wagenaar, 1984), as well as from renewed 
efforts to promote highway safety and reduce 
injuries, such as April 1983 legislation in- 
creasing penalties for alcohol-impaired driv- 
ing (hlichigan Public Acts 309.310, and 311 
of 19s”). In contrast to the overall reductions 
in the early and mid-19SOs, reductions in 
HBD and SVN crashes beginning in January 
1979 were limited to 18-20 year olds- the 
focus of the change in legal drinking age. 
To control for changes over time in the 
number of young drivers, the amount of mo- 
tor vehicle travel, and other factors influenc- 
ing the total number of crashes. the percent 
of all IS-20-year-old HBD drivers involved 
in injuy-producing crashes was analyzed, in- 
stead of simply the number of HBD drivers. 
Because of reporting of drinking drivers by 
police officers investigating crashes improved 
considerably during the early 197Os, only data 
after January 1976 were included in the time- 
series models. The iterative specification, es- 
timation, and diagnosis intemention analysis 
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FIGURE 1 
NUhlBER OF 18-ZO-YEAR-OLD POLICE-REPORTED DRINKING DRIVERS IN\‘OLl’ED IN 
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strategy produced the following final model crashes over the 6 years follo\ving imple- 
for the rate of young HBD drivers: mentation of the higher legal drinking age. 
(1 - B”) LnY, = (1 .c!%SB’~) (1 + .33B)a, - 
(.035) (.097) 
.0631,(1 -B”) - .2X,(1 - B’?) 
(.033) (.036) 
lvhere B is the backshift operator such that 
B(YJ = Y+ ,, LnY! is the natural logarithm 
of the youth HBD driver rate, al is random 
(Lvhite noise) error, II is a drinking age in- 
tervention step function, and N, is a step 
function controlling for the effects of the April 
1983 strengthened DWI legislation. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses belolv each 
parameter estimate. 
Con\.ersion of the intervention parameter 
in the logarithm metric to percent change 
revealed a statistically significant decrease 
of 6.1% in the rate of 18-20-year-old HBD 
driver involvement in injury-producing 
In addition to factors influencing overall 
crash involvement (controlled by examining 
the rate of alcohol-related crash involve- 
ment), other factors may have influenced 
the rate of alcohol-related crashes in recent 
years. To control for such alcohol-specific 
factors, the rate of HBD drivers age 21 and 
o\.er Lvho Lvere involved in injur\.-produc- 
ing crashes nas compared \vith the l&20- 
year-old group. In contrast to the drinking 
age, xvhich affects only drivers under 21, 
the impact of citizen action groups, in- 
creased publicity, and related events is ex- 
pected to influence alcohol-impaired driv- 
ing in all age groups. Comparisons between 
young and older drivers prevented these 
factors from confounding the obser\.ed ef- 
fects of the raised drinking age. 
Analysis produced the follo\ving model 
for the rate of HBD drivers age 21 and over 
involved in injury-producing crashes: 
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FIGURE 2 
NUhlBER OF 1%20sYE.-\R-OLD SVS DRIVERS INVOLVED IN INJURY-PRODUCING 
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(1 -B”) LnY, = (1 - .91B”) (1 + .32B)a, + 
(.034) (.09i) 
.lZIJl - B”) - .26S,(l -B”) 
(.024) (.023) 
indicating that drinking drivers 21 and 
over experienced a significant 13.4% in- 
crease in their rate of involvement in injury 
producing crashes in the early 1980s. Thus, 
the raised drinking age apparently pre- 
vented 18-20-year-olds from experiencing 
the same 13.4 ‘Jo increase in the rate of HBD 
crash involvement that occurred among 
those 21 and over. The difference between 
the intervention parameter estimates for the 
18-20 and 21-and-over age groups is clear11 
significant (2 = 4.64) and represents a 19% 
(6% plus 13%) reduction in the rate of 
drinking-driver crash involvement at- 
tributable to the increase in legal alcohol 
purchase age. 
Time series analyses produced the follo\v- 
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ing model for the SVN rate among 18-20- 
year-olds: 
(1 - B’,) LnY, = (1- .89B”) (1 + .58B)al + 
(.038) (.082) 
.0081,( 1 - B”) - .11X,(1 - B”) 
(.046) (.050) 
indicating no significant change after the 
drinking age was raised from 18 to 21. The 
lack of a significant change in SVN crash in- 
volvement among 18-20-year-olds contrasts 
with the significant 6.1% decline in HBD 
crashes noted above. Concluding that the 
legal age had no effect on youth SVN crash 
involvement would be premature, how- 
ever, because drivers age 21 and over ex- 
perienced a significant 16.6% increase in 
the rate of SVN crashes at the time 18-20- 
year-olds showed no change. Thus, it ap- 
pears that the raised legal age prevented the 
FIGURE 3 
NUblBER OF POLICE-REPORTED DRIVERS ACE 21 AND OVER INVOLVED IN 
ISJURY-PRODUCING .LIOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES. STATE OF XIICHIG.AS 
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increase in SVN crash involvement that oc- 
curred among motorists age 21 and over 
from occurring among those age 18-20. The 
time-series model for the SVN rate among 
those 21 and over is: 
(I - B*“) LnY, = (1 - .9lB”) (1 + .45B)a, - 
(.03-j) (.OS7) 
.151,(1 -B’“) - .20X,(1 -B”) 
(.039) (.040) 
Results for the SVN analyses are similar 
to those for the HBD analyses when the dif- 
ferences between the lS-20 and 21-and-over 
groups are taken into account. The difference 
between the bvo groups is significant (Z = 2.40) 
and represents a net 16 % reduction in the rate 
of lS-20-year-old SVN crash involvement 
from the levels expected, had the legal age 
not been changed. The difference between 
the two age groups is smaller for SVX crashes 
than for HBD crashes (16 Co versus 19 % ) , in- 
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dicating that a small part of the observed 
HBD effect may be due to a decrease in re- 
porting after the drinking age \vas raised. 
DISCUSSION 
The long-term effect of Xlichigan’s increase 
in legal drinking age should be compared with 
the short-term effect identified in previous re- 
search. Earlier time-series analyses revealed 
a 28 % reduction in HBD drivers involved in 
injury-producing crashes and an 11% reduc- 
tion in SW injury-producing crashes during 
the first 12 months after Michigan raised its 
drinking age (\Vagenaar, 1983). Because both 
measures of crash involvement have their lim- 
itations, the midpoint of these tvvo estimates, 
19.5 % , is a reasonable overall estimate of the 
short-term reduction in alcohol-related crash 
involvement attributable to the increase in 
the legal age. In the current study, time-series 
analyses of baseline and 6 years of post-law- 
change data revealed reductions of 19% in 
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FIGURE 4 
NUMBER OF SVN DRIVERS AGE 21 AND OLDER INVOLVED IN INJURY-PRODLUNG 
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the rate of HBD drivers involved in injury- 
producing crashes and 16% in the rate of 
SVN injury-producing crashes, both attribut- 
able to the drinking age increase. The simi- 
larity of findings from analyses of two admit- 
tedly imperfect measures of alcohol-impaired 
driving increases confidence in the validity of 
each. 
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals 
for the estimated long-term effect of the drink- 
ing age in reducing youth crash involvement 
are 12 to 26% for the HBD measure and 9 to 
29 % for the SVN measure. Based on these re- 
sults, two conclusions can be made. First, the 
long-term effects of Michigan’s increase in 
legal drinking age are not significantly dif- 
ferent from the short-term effects identified 
in earlier research. Second, the results for the 
State of Michigan are consistent with the ex- 
periences in numerous other states. 
Evidence to date clearly indicates the ex- 
istence of an effect of raised legal drinking 
ages on youth crash involvement. The exact 
magnitude (i.e., point estimate) of that effect 
varies from study to study, but most frequent- 
ly is in the 10 to 20% range. A few recent 
studies appear to indicate that a raised legal 
age has little effect on motor vehicle crash in- 
volvement (Hingson et al., 19S.3; Smith et al., 
1984; Bolotin & DeSario, 19S5a, 1985b). The 
apparent inconsistency between these studies 
and the results of most of the drinking age 
literature may be due to the different levels 
of statistical power of the research designs 
and analytic methods used. In some cases, a 
conclusion of “no significant effect” of the 
drinking age is a result of a study design with 
inadequate statistical power to detect an ef- 
fect within the range expected. Given the re- 
sults presented here and the findings of other 
recent studies (Arnold, 1985: DuMouchel et 
al., 1985), the best estimate of the long-term 
effects of a higher legal drinking age is a 
decline in SVN crash involvement of about 
15 % . If the research design used to measure 
the effects of a legal age change requires a 
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decline in youth crash in\.ol\.ement larger 
than 1.5 R to achieve statistic4 significance, 
it is unlikely that a significant effect of the 
drinking age xvi11 be found.3 
A conclusion of “no statisticall>. significant 
effect” is interpreted by many policy-makers 
as “no effect,” when it really means that no 
effect of a specific magnitude was found. 
Therefore, researchers should state clearly the 
smallest effect that could be measured bv 
their study. In the study of ,Lfichigan’s loni- 
term experience reported here, a drinking age 
effect smaller than a 7 ‘;D decline in crash in- 
volvement could not be detected.l 
Continuing research is needed to fullv un- 
derstand the nature of the effects of higher 
drinking ages. Nevertheless, available evi- 
dence clearly indicates that a higher drinking 
age redu~es.injuries and damage. If the goal 
is to reduce alcohol-related traffic casualties, 
a legal age of 21 is recommended. Despite the 
safety benefits of a higher drinking age, some 
argue in favor of a lower drinking age based 
on equity, difficulty in enforcement, and other 
considerations not related to health and safe- 
ty. Numerous such arguments can reasonably 
be made. For esample, interviews with a sam- 
ple of Massachusetts police officers found lit- 
tle support for the higher age among some of- 
ficers, high variability in enforcement levels, 
and minimal enforcement in some areas (Hing- 
son et al., 1983). Given such low enforcement 
levels, some argue that the higher drinking 
age may foster disrespect for the law among 
youth, and that the lack of resolve to enforce 
this law indicates that other strategies may 
be more effective in reducing crashes among 
drivers of all ages. Despite the paucity of pol- 
icies and programs that have a demonstrated 
long-term effect in reducing alcohol-related 
traffic crashes, many individuals favor using 
3For example, the stndy design used by Hingson et 
al. (198.3) required a drinking age effect of at least a 
2.5% decline in SVN crash involvement to reach 
statistical significance at the 0.03 le\.-el. Any effect 
smaller than that could not be detected. 
‘The 7% minimum detectable effect of the research 
design used here is based on comparisons betlreen the 
l&z0 and “l-and-over age gro&. Analyses of the 
IS-20 group alone could detect crash reductions as 
small as 5%. 
approaches other than the minimum age to 
reduce alcohoI-impaired driving. 
Although all of these issues deserve atten- 
tion in the policy debates srlrrounding the 
drinking age, they should not obscure the re- 
search evidence that an increase in drinking 
age from 1S to 20 or 21 lowers the incidence 
of traffic crashes among young alcohol-im- 
paired drivers. Whether the injury-pre\,en- 
tion benefits of a higher Iegal age are xvorth 
more than the perceived benefits of easy ac- 
cess to alcohol for youth is a value judgment. 
Recent events suggest that health profession- 
als, policy-makers, and the public clearly be- 
lieve the benefits outweigh the perceived costs 
of a legal drinking age of 21. 
Finall!., and perhaps most importantly, 
the legal age for drinking should not be 
viexved as an isolated policy. Rather, it is 
one example of an approach to the preten- 
tion of alcohol-related problems that focuses 
on restricting the availability and distribution 
of alcoholic beverages. An increase in the le- 
gal drinking age makes it more difficult for 
l’oung people to acquire and use alcoholic 
beverages; that is, it reduces alcohol ai.aila- 
bility. Xlany states have experimented xvith 
various levels of alcohol availability as re- 
flected by changes in the legal age - 21 for 
many lrears, 18 for several years. then back to 
21 (or some intermediate age). These changes 
in availability of alcohol to youth have signif- 
icantly affected the extent of at least one ma- 
jor alcohol-related health problem - automo- 
bile crash-related injuries. Public policies on 
other dimensions of alcohol availability not 
limited to one specific age group (e.g., retail 
price of alcohol; design, location, number, 
and density of alcohol outlets; and selling, 
serving, and marketing practices) should be 
examined for their utility in the prevention 
of alcohol-related health and social problems. 
A combination of numerous regulatorv, poli- 
cy, and programmatic efforts is req&ed to 
achieve the ultimate goal of a society in xvhich 
the operation of a motor vehicle after the con- 
sumption of alcoholic beverages is taboo. 
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